Existential crisis definition: what the term means and where it comes from

Explained

An existential crisis is a period in which questions about death, freedom, meaning or identity stop being abstract and start to unsettle a person's sense of how to live. The questions themselves are old; what makes it a crisis is that the usual answers suddenly stop holding.

This page is about the idea: what the phrase means, what it is often confused with, and which philosophers and psychotherapists gave it its shape, from Kierkegaard in the 1840s to Irvin Yalom in 1980. It is not a guide to anyone’s condition. The term is not a diagnosis, and if you are struggling right now, a conversation with a doctor or therapist will help more than a definition.

Quick answer

An existential crisis is a stretch of time in which a person’s working answers about why to live, and how, give way under questions of death, freedom, isolation or meaning. It is a philosophical and psychological idea, not a clinical diagnosis: it appears in neither the DSM nor the ICD.

Not a diagnosis, and not a substitute for help

Feelings that people describe as an existential crisis can overlap with, or be mistaken for, depression or an anxiety disorder, and only a clinician can tell them apart. If you are in distress, talk to a doctor, therapist or someone you trust. In the US you can call or text 988 to reach the Suicide and Crisis Lifeline at any hour.

What the phrase existential crisis does not mean

Four common misreadings, and why the distinctions matter

The word existential here means “to do with existence itself”: the plain facts that we will die, that we have to choose, that no one else can live our life for us, and that meaning is not handed to us ready-made. A crisis, in the older medical sense, is a turning point. Put together, the phrase names a turning point in how someone relates to those facts. Most of the confusion around the term comes from stretching it to cover things it was never meant to name.

  • It is not a clinical diagnosis. Neither the DSM-5-TR nor the ICD-11 lists it. Clinicians may hear the phrase from a client, but they assess mood, anxiety and risk on their own terms.
  • It is not the same as a midlife crisis. The psychoanalyst Elliott Jaques coined “midlife crisis” in a 1965 paper, tying it to the dawning awareness of one’s own death around middle age. An existential crisis can happen at any age, and a midlife crisis is only one setting for it.
  • It is not an identity crisis. “Identity crisis” is Erik Erikson’s term for a developmental task, mostly of adolescence and young adulthood: working out who one is among roles and values. An existential crisis asks a different question, less “who am I?” than “why live this way at all?”
  • It is not simply sadness, and not a sign of faulty thinking. The existential tradition treats these questions as accurate perceptions of the human situation, not errors to be corrected. The distress is real; the questions are not a malfunction.

That last point is what separates the existential view from a purely symptom-based one. In the tradition behind existential therapy, the goal is not to make the questions go away but to face them with less dread. None of this rules out depression or anxiety, which can arrive dressed in philosophical language; that is exactly why the distinction is a clinician’s call and not a reader’s.

From Kierkegaard to Yalom: how the idea of crisis took shape

Six writers across 140 years, each naming the same experience differently

No single writer invented the existential crisis. The phrase itself is a twentieth-century coinage, but the experience it describes was mapped piece by piece by philosophers and then by psychotherapists. If you want the whole shelf in a sensible order, our reading order for existential therapy books lays it out; what follows is the line of ideas.

Søren Kierkegaard comes first. In The Concept of Anxiety (1844) he describes anxiety as the “dizziness of freedom”: the vertigo of standing before possibilities that only you can choose between. Five years later, in The Sickness unto Death (1849), he turns to despair, which he treats not as a passing mood but as a failure to become the self one is, often present in people who do not notice it. Both books appeared under pseudonyms, and both read the inner unrest that later writers would call a crisis as something that belongs to being a self, not as an illness.

Martin Heidegger, in Being and Time (1927), gave the idea its technical vocabulary. His Angst is not fear of any particular thing. It is the mood in which the familiar world of routines and shared opinions, what he calls “the they”, suddenly loses its grip, and a person is thrown back on the fact of their own finite existence. For Heidegger this is unsettling but also clarifying: it is how one becomes able to live one’s own life rather than the one everyone else is living.

Jean-Paul Sartre and Albert Camus brought these ideas to a wide postwar readership. Sartre’s “anguish” is the awareness that we are wholly responsible for what we make of ourselves, with no fixed human nature to fall back on. Camus, in The Myth of Sisyphus (1942), named the clash between our hunger for meaning and a world that gives no answer “the absurd”. His conclusion is not despair: he ends with Sisyphus pushing his rock, and with the claim that we must imagine him happy.

Paul Tillich, a theologian, gave the most useful map for anyone trying to tell kinds of existential distress apart. In The Courage to Be (1952) he distinguishes three anxieties: of fate and death, of emptiness and meaninglessness, and of guilt and condemnation. He argued that each era leans toward one of them, and that the modern age leans toward the second. His answer was courage, the act of affirming one’s life in spite of what threatens it.

Viktor Frankl moved the idea from philosophy into clinical work. In Man’s Search for Meaning, first published in German in 1946, and in his writing on logotherapy, he describes an “existential vacuum”: a widespread sense of inner emptiness when neither instinct nor tradition tells people what to do any more. Frankl’s books are best read in sequence; our guide to Viktor Frankl’s books in order shows where the vacuum idea develops.

Irvin Yalom then gathered these strands into a working framework for therapists. In Existential Psychotherapy (1980) he organises the field around four ultimate concerns: death, freedom, isolation and meaninglessness. That framework is how most existential therapists still think about what is happening when a client says that life has stopped making sense.

Thinker and workTheir name for itWhat sets it off, in their account
Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety (1844)Anxiety, the dizziness of freedomStanding before open possibilities that only you can choose between
Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death (1849)DespairFailing, often unknowingly, to become the self one is
Heidegger, Being and Time (1927)AngstThe everyday world of shared routine losing its hold, exposing one’s own finitude
Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus (1942)The absurdThe human demand for meaning meeting a world that offers none
Tillich, The Courage to Be (1952)Three anxietiesFate and death; emptiness and meaninglessness; guilt and condemnation
Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning (1946) and later writingExistential vacuumLoss of the instincts and traditions that once told people how to live
Yalom, Existential Psychotherapy (1980)The four ultimate concernsConfronting death, freedom, isolation or meaninglessness, often after a loss or a close call
Different names for the same unsettling question

Tolstoy's A Confession: an existential crisis told from the inside

The best-known literary example of the experience

For a concrete example of an existential crisis, the classic text is Leo Tolstoy’s A Confession, written around 1879 to 1882. Tolstoy was about fifty, famous, wealthy, healthy and happily married by his own account, with War and Peace and Anna Karenina behind him. And yet, he writes, a simple question began to stop him in his tracks: what will come of anything I do, today or tomorrow, given that I will die and be forgotten? He could find no answer that satisfied him, and the success that should have protected him made the question sharper, not softer.

Tolstoy illustrates his state with an old Eastern fable: a traveller hangs from a branch inside a well, a beast waiting above and a dragon below, while two mice gnaw at the branch, and he licks a few drops of honey from the leaves. The honey, for Tolstoy, was family and art; he says it had stopped tasting sweet. What makes the book so useful for understanding the idea is that nothing outwardly went wrong. The crisis was about meaning, not circumstance, which is exactly the distinction the existential writers draw.

Tolstoy returned to the theme in fiction with The Death of Ivan Ilyich (1886), whose hero sees only on his deathbed how borrowed his life had been. Existential therapists, Yalom among them, often cite the story as a picture of death awareness waking a person up. Yalom’s own book for general readers on that theme is Staring at the Sun.

How Yalom's four ultimate concerns frame an existential crisis

Why therapists in this tradition talk about givens rather than symptoms

Yalom’s contribution was to turn the philosophers’ insights into something a therapist could work with. On his account, each of the four concerns is a given of existence that people mostly keep out of view, and much ordinary anxiety comes from the effort of keeping it there. Our page on the four givens of existence takes each one in detail; the short version for this page is that an existential crisis, in Yalom’s terms, is what happens when one of those givens breaks through the defences that usually hold it back.

That framing explains why the same crisis can look so different from one person to the next. For one person death is in the foreground, after a diagnosis, a bereavement or a near miss. For another it is freedom: the realisation that a career or marriage was chosen, and could be unchosen. For a third it is isolation, the sense that no one can fully share one’s experience; for a fourth, meaninglessness. The underlying vocabulary of dread is examined further on our page about existential anxiety.

Yalom and Frankl draw on the same tradition but weight it differently. Frankl puts meaning at the centre and treats the vacuum as the defining problem of the age; Yalom treats meaninglessness as one concern among four and gives death the most weight. Our comparison of Yalom and Frankl sets the two side by side.

What is disputed about the idea of an existential crisis

Where the concept is stretched, romanticised or culturally narrow

The idea has its critics, and a fair account should say so. The first objection is that it is vague. Because it is not a clinical category, there is no agreed boundary between an existential crisis and a hard patch, a depressive episode or simple burnout. Researchers who study meaning in life have built questionnaires around related ideas, but there is no single measure of an existential crisis, and claims about how common it is should be treated with caution.

A second objection is that the concept can be romanticised. The image of the anguished thinker can make suffering seem profound in a way that discourages people from seeking ordinary help. Existential therapists themselves warn against this; the tradition values facing hard questions, but not at the cost of ignoring treatable illness. A third is cultural: much of the literature is European, modern and written in the aftermath of declining religious belief, and it is not obvious that people in other traditions experience mortality and meaning through the same frame.

On the other side, some writers argue that these periods can be a source of growth. The Polish psychiatrist Kazimierz Dąbrowski, writing in the 1960s, described a “positive disintegration” in which an old way of living has to come apart before a more considered one can form. That is a hopeful reading, but it is a theory, not a promise, and it is not a reason to wait out real distress alone.

Where to read the idea of existential crisis in the original

Primary texts first, then the guides on this site

For the idea in its own words, the shortest route is Tolstoy’s A Confession, which can be read in an afternoon, followed by Camus’s The Myth of Sisyphus and Tillich’s The Courage to Be. Kierkegaard and Heidegger are harder going and are better approached through an introduction. For the clinical view, Frankl’s Man’s Search for Meaning is the accessible starting point and Yalom’s Existential Psychotherapy the full synthesis.

This page deliberately does not recommend books as a response to a crisis. That is a different question, and we cover it on its own page: books to read during an existential crisis. If the questions arrived around middle age, our list of books on the midlife crisis covers the Jaques line of thinking and what came after it.

Frequently Asked Questions
What is the simple definition of an existential crisis?

It is a period in which questions about death, freedom, isolation or meaning stop feeling abstract and begin to unsettle a person’s sense of how to live. The questions are permanent features of human life; the crisis is the moment the usual answers stop working.

Is existential crisis a mental health diagnosis?

No. It does not appear in the DSM-5-TR or the ICD-11. It is a philosophical and psychological idea. What people describe as an existential crisis can overlap with depression or anxiety, and only a clinician can assess that.

Who first used the term existential crisis?

No single author is credited with the phrase. The experience was described by Kierkegaard in the 1840s and by Heidegger, Sartre, Camus, Tillich and Frankl in the twentieth century, and the phrase became common as existentialism reached a wide readership after the Second World War.

What is a famous example of an existential crisis?

Leo Tolstoy’s A Confession is the best-known first-hand account. Around the age of fifty, at the height of his success, he found that he could no longer answer the question of what his life and work would amount to in the face of death.

How is an existential crisis different from a midlife crisis?

Elliott Jaques coined the term midlife crisis in 1965 for a reckoning with mortality tied to middle age. An existential crisis is the broader idea: it can happen at any age and can centre on freedom, isolation or meaning as well as death.

How do existential therapists understand an existential crisis?

Most follow Irvin Yalom’s Existential Psychotherapy (1980), which frames such periods around four ultimate concerns: death, freedom, isolation and meaninglessness. The aim is to face those concerns more fully, alongside whatever other care a person needs.

Conclusion

An existential crisis is a question about how to live, not a diagnosis

The phrase names a turning point in which the facts of death, freedom, isolation and meaning break through ordinary routine. Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Camus, Tillich and Frankl each described it in their own terms, and Yalom’s four ultimate concerns are how existential therapists frame it today. It is an idea for understanding the human situation, not a label for a disorder, and anyone in real distress deserves professional support alongside it.