Ontological insecurity explained: R. D. Laing’s term and its second life
Ontological insecurity is a phrase from the Scottish psychiatrist R. D. Laing, who used it in The Divided Self (1960) for a person who cannot take their own realness, aliveness and continuity for granted.
The phrase now turns up in sociology, international relations and online writing about anxiety, often with very little of Laing’s meaning left in it. This guide sets out what the term meant to Laing, what it does not mean, how the sociologist Anthony Giddens gave it a second career, and why Laing himself remains a contested figure.
Ontological insecurity is R. D. Laing’s term, from The Divided Self (1960), for a basic uncertainty about whether one is real, alive and continuous as a self. It is not a diagnosis and not ordinary insecurity. Anthony Giddens later reused the opposite, ontological security, for the everyday trust that the world and the self are stable.

What ontological insecurity is not: a diagnosis, low self-esteem, angst
First, ontological insecurity is not a diagnosis. It appears in no diagnostic manual, neither the DSM nor the ICD, and no clinician will write it on a chart. It is a descriptive and philosophical term from one psychiatrist’s book, closer to a lens for understanding experience than to a category for sorting people.
Second, it is not ordinary insecurity. Feeling unsure of your looks, your work or whether people like you is a doubt about how good or wanted a self is. Laing’s term points at something prior to that: a doubt about whether there is a solid, real self there at all. Low self-esteem assumes a self that is rated badly; ontological insecurity, in Laing’s sense, is uncertainty about the self’s very being. Ontology is the branch of philosophy that asks what exists, which is why the word was chosen.
Third, it is not the same as existential anxiety. In the existential tradition, anxiety about death, freedom, isolation and meaninglessness is a normal response to being human; the tradition treats it as something everyone meets, not as a sign that something has gone wrong. The site’s guide to the four givens of existence sets out that frame, and existential isolation is a good example of a given that every secure person still faces. Laing’s ontologically insecure person is not someone facing these shared questions squarely; it is someone for whom the ground those questions stand on is itself in doubt. For a wider map of the field these ideas belong to, start with the reading order in the best existential therapy books.
R. D. Laing's The Divided Self and the chapter that named the idea
Ronald David Laing was a Scottish psychiatrist, born in Glasgow in 1927, who died in 1989. The Divided Self, his first book, was published in 1960 with the subtitle An Existential Study in Sanity and Madness. Its aim was to make the experience of people diagnosed with schizophrenia, and of people he called schizoid, intelligible to a reader rather than treating it as meaningless noise to be catalogued. One of its chapters is titled “Ontological Insecurity”, and it is there that the contrast at the centre of this page is drawn.
Laing describes the ontologically secure person as someone who takes their own realness, aliveness and continuity for granted. Such a person feels that they are a whole, embodied self that persists through time and is distinct from other people, and they can meet the ordinary hazards of life from that base without the base itself being at stake. Most people never think about this at all, which is exactly Laing’s point: security of this kind is invisible to those who have it.
The ontologically insecure person, by contrast, is someone for whom these things are in question. Where the secure person can enter a relationship, an argument or a crowd without fearing for their existence as a self, the insecure person may experience the same ordinary encounters as threats to their very being. Laing’s method was to describe this from the inside, drawing on existential philosophers such as Sartre and Heidegger, and on the existential-phenomenological psychiatry that also shaped figures like Ludwig Binswanger, whose world-categories appear in the site’s page on Umwelt.
Engulfment, implosion and petrification in Laing's account
Laing names three forms that anxiety takes when the self is not securely grounded. They are concepts in a theory, offered to help a reader understand, and they are not a checklist for identifying anything in oneself or anyone else.
Engulfment is the dread of being swallowed up by another person or by relationship as such. For the secure person, being understood or loved confirms the self. In Laing’s account, for the insecure person closeness can feel like a risk of losing one’s identity inside someone else, so that keeping apart becomes a way of keeping a self at all. That is why Laing could see withdrawal not as indifference but as protection.
Implosion is Laing’s word for the fear that reality itself will crash in and obliterate the self. He links it to an inner sense of emptiness: if the self feels like a vacuum, then the world pressing in is felt as something that could flood and wipe it out, rather than as the ordinary flow of events a secure person takes in without thinking.
Petrification is the fear of being turned from a living person into a thing, as in the old image of being turned to stone. Laing pairs it with depersonalisation: treating the other person as a thing in return, so that they cannot do the same to you. Here the debt to Sartre, who wrote about the look of the other as something that can fix a person as an object, is especially clear.
What links the three is that each takes something the secure person experiences as harmless or even good (being close, being in the world, being seen) and shows how it can feel like a threat to existence when the self is not felt as real and continuous. That reversal is the core of Laing’s argument, and it is what most loose uses of the phrase leave out.
Anthony Giddens and the second life of ontological security
Most people who meet the phrase today meet its positive form, ontological security, and they meet it through sociology rather than psychiatry. The British sociologist Anthony Giddens took the term up in The Constitution of Society (1984) and developed it further in Modernity and Self-Identity (1991). For Giddens, ontological security is the ordinary, mostly unspoken trust that the world and one’s own self are stable and will go on being roughly what they were yesterday.
In Giddens’ use the emphasis falls on routine. The same route to work, the same kitchen, the same faces and the same unwritten rules of conversation all quietly confirm that the world is as expected. A simple illustration: someone who moves to a new country often finds that small things, such as not knowing how to queue, greet or pay, are tiring out of all proportion to their size. On a Giddens reading, that tiredness is the cost of routines no longer doing their invisible work. Nothing in this is a clinical observation; it is a description of how social life holds a sense of continuity in place.
From sociology the idea moved into international relations theory, where writers such as Jennifer Mitzen and Brent Steele argued in the 2000s that states, like people, seek a stable sense of identity and may cling to familiar routines, even harmful ones such as long-running rivalries, because those routines make the world predictable. In this third setting the term has travelled furthest from Laing: it describes collective identity, not an individual’s experience.
| R. D. Laing | Anthony Giddens | |
|---|---|---|
| Field | Existential-phenomenological psychiatry | Sociology, later taken into international relations theory |
| Key works | The Divided Self (1960) | The Constitution of Society (1984); Modernity and Self-Identity (1991) |
| Main term | Ontological insecurity, set against the secure person | Ontological security, and its disruption |
| What it describes | Whether one’s own realness, aliveness and continuity can be taken for granted | Everyday trust that the world and the self are stable, kept up by routine |
| Unit of analysis | One person’s experience, described from the inside | People in social life; in IR, also states |
| Tone | Concerned with deep disturbance of the self | Concerned with the ordinary, mostly unnoticed workings of trust |
Read side by side, the two uses share a picture: a self that normally feels continuous without effort, and what happens when that background feeling fails. They differ in scale and purpose. Laing wanted to understand individuals in extreme distress; Giddens wanted to explain how ordinary social life and modern identity hold together. When an article uses “ontological security” about national identity or about routines at work, it is almost always in Giddens’ line, not Laing’s.
What is contested about Laing and The Divided Self
Laing wrote The Divided Self as a psychiatrist trying to make psychosis understandable, and the book’s humane attention to experience is the reason it is still read. His wider views are another matter. In later work, including Sanity, Madness and the Family (1964, with Aaron Esterson), he emphasised the family setting in which a person came to be diagnosed with schizophrenia, and he became associated with the so-called anti-psychiatry movement. Mainstream psychiatry does not accept his views on schizophrenia and the family, and families of people with serious mental illness have long objected to the implication that they caused it.
For that reason The Divided Self is read today as a work of existential phenomenology, a careful attempt to describe experience from the inside, and not as a clinical guide. That is also the right way to read the term ontological insecurity: as a piece of philosophical description, not as something to apply to yourself or to people you know. Anyone troubled by experiences like these should speak with a mental health professional, and in the US you can call or text 988, the Suicide and Crisis Lifeline, in a crisis.
Reading Laing on ontological insecurity, and what to read beside it
- The Divided Self by R. D. Laing (1960): read the chapter titled “Ontological Insecurity” first, then go back to the opening chapters on method.
- Modernity and Self-Identity by Anthony Giddens (1991): the clearest place to see ontological security as a sociological idea about trust and routine.
- Existential Psychotherapy by Irvin D. Yalom (1980): not about Laing’s term, but the fullest account of the existential anxieties that everyone shares, which is the contrast this page draws.
If you are new to this tradition, the plain-English guide What Is Existential Therapy? explains how existential thinkers approach anxiety, freedom and meaning in therapy. The page on the existential crisis is a useful companion, because it is another term that is often stretched into a diagnosis it never was. And if the theme of keeping a self apart from others interests you, solitude vs isolation shows how Tillich, Arendt and Yalom drew lines between kinds of aloneness.
Who coined the term ontological insecurity?
The Scottish psychiatrist R. D. Laing, in The Divided Self (1960), where one chapter is titled “Ontological Insecurity”.
Is ontological insecurity a mental health diagnosis?
No. It does not appear in any diagnostic manual. It is a descriptive term from Laing’s existential-phenomenological account of experience, not a clinical category.
What is the difference between ontological insecurity and low self-esteem?
Low self-esteem is a poor opinion of a self that is taken to exist. Ontological insecurity, in Laing’s sense, is uncertainty about whether one is real, alive and continuous as a self at all.
What are engulfment, implosion and petrification?
They are the three forms of anxiety Laing describes in The Divided Self: the dread of being swallowed up by others, of reality crashing in on an empty self, and of being turned into a thing, which he pairs with depersonalisation.
How did Anthony Giddens use ontological security?
In The Constitution of Society (1984) and Modernity and Self-Identity (1991), Giddens used it for the everyday trust, kept up by routine, that the world and the self are stable. International relations theorists later applied it to states.
Did Irvin Yalom write about ontological insecurity?
This is Laing’s term, not Yalom’s. Yalom’s existential work concerns the anxieties everyone shares about death, freedom, isolation and meaning, which is a useful contrast to Laing’s idea.
Ontological insecurity is Laing's lens on the self, not a label
Ontological insecurity names Laing’s picture of a person who cannot take their own realness and continuity for granted, with engulfment, implosion and petrification as its three forms. It is not a diagnosis, not low self-esteem and not the shared existential anxiety of being human. Giddens turned its opposite into a sociological idea about trust and routine, which is the sense most readers now meet.